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Theoretical models are widely held as sources of knowledge of reality. Imagination 
is vital to their development and to the generation of plausible hypotheses about 
reality. But how can imagination, which is typically held to be completely free, 
effectively instruct us about reality? In this paper I argue that the key to answering 
this question is in constrained uses of imagination. More specifically, I identify 
make-believe as the right notion of imagination at work in modelling. I propose the 
first overarching taxonomy of types of constraints on scientific imagination that 
enables knowledge of reality. And I identify two main kinds of knowledge enabled 
by models, knowledge of the imaginary scenario specified by models and 
knowledge of reality.  
 







How do we learn about reality through scientific models? Answering this question 
requires distinguishing between two main kinds of models, material and theoret-
ical. Material models are physical objects that serve as representations of physical 
systems. Theoretical models are mathematical models that do not exist as physi-
cal objects and for this reason are sometimes called ‘fictional’. Morgan (1999) 
originally argued that learning with models involves two steps, model building 
and model manipulation. Frigg and Hartmann (2018) notice that material models 
are used in experimental contexts and do not raise any special problems beyond 
general questions about learning through experimentation. Fictional models, 
however, do raise serious concerns. What are the constraints on model building 
and model manipulation in fictional models? Answering this question requires 
that we recognise the crucial role of imagination in fictional models. Learning 
through fictional models requires imagination and the value of scientific imagi-





Consider a simple but paradigmatic example, Maxwell’s thermodynamic 
ideal gas model, which represents a gas as a large number of particles bouncing 
against each other and against the walls of a closed container. The model is usu-
ally identified with the following equation:  
pV = nRT. 
The equation per se is not a model of anything unless it is used under an interpre-
tation. In this case, 𝑝 is pressure, 𝑉 is volume, 𝑛 is the number of moles, 𝑅 is the 
gas constant, and 𝑇 is temperature. To facilitate mathematical treatment, the 
model makes certain simplifying assumptions. It assumes that the gas is com-
posed of molecules construed as point particles having no volume in and of them-
selves, exerting no intermolecular forces, and bouncing against each other and 
against the walls of the container in elastic collisions that do not involve any con-
version of kinetic energy into other forms of energy. Of course, there are no gases 
that are composed of such idealised molecules. Real gases are composed of mol-
ecules that have some finite volume, that exert intermolecular forces and collide 
in non-elastic ways. The ideal gas model describes an imaginary gas composed of 
imaginary particles interacting under imaginary conditions. Nevertheless, the 
model provides a useful approximation of the behaviour of many real gases under 
temperatures that are near room temperature and pressures that are near atmos-
pheric pressure.  
Philosophers usually recognise that imagination has an important role in 
modelling. Cartwright understands modelling as offering “descriptions of imagi-
nary situations or systems” (2010: 22). Godfrey-Smith suggests we “take at face 
value the fact that modelers often take themselves to be describing imaginary bi-
ological populations, imaginary neural networks, or imaginary economies” 
(2006: 735) and sees modelling as involving an “act of imagination” (2009: 47). 
Harré sees models as things that are “imagined” (1988: 121). Sugden regards 
models as “imaginary” worlds (2009: 5). Weisberg discussing the Lotka-Volterra 
model of predator-prey interaction reports that Volterra “imagined a simple bio-
logical system” (2007: 208) and further recognises that “[m]odelers often speak 
about their work as if they were imagining systems” (2013: 48). Frigg (2010), Levy 
(2015), Salis (2019; 2020a), Salis and Frigg (2020), and Toon (2012) present anal-
yses that place acts of imagination at the heart of modelling.  
When it comes to explaining how models enable knowledge of reality, how-
ever, standard explanations dismiss uses of imagination in modelling as ill-suited 
to scientific reasoning. Notwithstanding their differences, these accounts agree in 
connecting learning with the representational function of models (Giere 1988; 
Knuuttila and Voutilainen 2003; Mäki 1992, 2005; Suárez 2004; Swoyer 1991; 
Weisberg 2007, 2013). On these views, a model description (the mathematical 
equation and linguistic assumptions of the ideal gas model) specify a simplified 
surrogate (the idealised gas) of a real system (some real gas). The surrogate is 
called model system and the real system is called target system. A model system 
is interpreted as a symbol representing a target in ways that enable the generation 
of plausible hypotheses based on a relation of similarity with the target, where 
similarity is usually understood as the sharing of certain properties in some re-
spects and to some degree.  
While these standard proposals advance many important ideas, they do not 
satisfy one key theoretical requirement that Frigg (2010) calls naturalism. Accord-
ing to naturalism, any account of how scientists learn with models should be able 
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to explain scientific practice, namely it should explain how scientists construct 
models and how they reason with them. This is what Thomson-Jones (2010) calls 
the face-value practice of modelling. Scientists present model-descriptions that 
specify model-systems as objects of study. Model descriptions involve the attrib-
ution of properties that only concrete objects can have, yet there are no objects 
instantiating these properties. Scientists think and talk as if there were such con-
crete systems having such and such properties, yet they are aware that there are 
none. They merely imagine that there are systems having such and such proper-
ties.  
So, modelling crucially relies on imagination. Yet, standard accounts do not 
offer any explanation of how knowledge of reality is obtained through imagina-
tion. The result is a poor understanding of the epistemic role of imagination in 
modelling. Pre-theoretically, imagination is often thought of as completely free 
and unconstrained. In this vein, many think of imagination as a means to escape 
reality, as when we engage in daydreams and fantasies that provide diversion and 
create new things that depart from reality. Pessimists about our ability to gain 
knowledge through imagination emphasise the freedom of imagination (Des-
cartes 1985; Norton 1991; Spaulding 2016). There is, however, another pre-theo-
retical notion of imagination as a means to learn about reality, as when we engage 
in problem solving, mindreading, thought experimenting, counterfactual reason-
ing and, of course, scientific modelling. The key to this second notion is the idea 
that imagination can be constrained in ways that effectively enable knowledge of 
reality. 
In this paper I shed new light on this issue by developing a new notion of 
constrained imagination that is motivated by the face-value practice of scientists 
and by the recognition of the importance of scientific cognition involving imagi-
nation. In Section 2, I start by identifying two main varieties of imagination that 
are currently deemed crucial to scientific models, counterfactual imagination 
(Godfrey-Smith 2020) and make-believe (Salis and Frigg 2020). In Section 3, I 
argue that standard analyses of counterfactual imagination in modelling raise im-
portant issues that deserve further theoretical development. In section 4, I identify 
make-believe as a more suitable option and explain its role in model building and 
model development. In Section 5, I put forward a taxonomy of types of con-
straints operating on imagination in modelling based on contemporary literature 
in cognitive science and philosophy. Finally, in Section 6, I draw some conclu-
sions.  
 
2. Imagination  
What sort of imagination is involved in models? Imagination is ordinarily con-
strued as mental imagery, which is an ability to form a sensory-like representation 
of something (real or non-existent) in any sensory modality (imagining seeing, 
imagining hearing, imagining smelling, imagining touching, imagining tasting). 
The most common variety is visual imagery, which is often referred to as seeing 
in the mind’s eye, imagining seeing or visualising. Scientists often appeal to this 
pre-theoretical notion in introspective reports and descriptions of activities that 
were key to the generation of new ideas. In the 19th century, Michael Faraday 
contributed to the foundations of classical electromagnetic theory by imagining 




Starting from this picture, James Clerk Maxwell studied lines of force by produc-
ing a series of mechanical models of the ether, which led to his famous set of 
equations (Maxwell 1965). In the same century, August Kekulé discovered the 
structure of the molecule of benzene after a daydream in which he saw a snake 
biting its own tail (Findley 1948). These and similar cases led to the widespread 
recognition of the key role of imagery in scientific discovery, conceptual change 
and innovation (Magnani 2009; Nersessian 2008, 2009).  
Whether imagery has a key epistemic role in modelling, however, is currently 
disputed. In particular, Salis and Frigg (2020) emphasise that mental images are 
neither necessary nor sufficient to scientific modelling. For example, the ideal gas 
model requires imagining that the gas be composed of point particles having no 
volume in and of themselves and bouncing against each other in elastic collisions. 
These imaginings involve certain theoretical concepts (point particle, volume, 
elastic collision) and relations within the imaginary scenario described by the 
model. Whether they are accompanied by mental images or not seems to be irrel-
evant to the epistemic function of models.  
In fact, another notion of imagination has gained traction in the contempo-
rary philosophical literature on scientific modelling, that of propositional imagi-
nation. This is an ability to entertain a proposition without any commitment to 
its truth, with or without forming a mental image. This somewhat minimal notion 
of imagination, which is akin to a notion of acceptance, has been specified in two 
main varieties that are deemed crucial to the modelling practice, counterfactual 
imagination and make-believe.1  
 
3. Counterfactual Imagination 
Godfrey-Smith (2020) recognises the key role of conditional thinking and, in par-
ticular, the counterfactual imagination in modelling. Conditionals are statements 
of the form if A then C. A counterfactual conditional is a subjunctive conditional 
where the antecedent is known or assumed to be false, or A □→ C. For example, 
one might imagine that if Hillary Clinton had won the elections in 2016 (counter-
factual antecedent), then the US would have led a coordinated effort to combat 
COVID-19 with allies in Europe, Asia and the Americas. Godfrey-Smith notices 
that counterfactual conditionals in modelling often involve generalisations such 
as if there were a system like this, it would do that, or M □→ C, where the antecedent 
M stands for the model assumptions and the consequent C stands for the conse-
quence that follows from M. For example, if there were a gas having these and 
these features, then it would behave like this (ideal gas model); or, if there were 
two celestial bodies having features F, then they would do that (sun-earth model). 
The antecedents in these conditionals are assumed to be false. Scientists know 
that they are never realised in the actual world.  
Implicit criteria for how imagination is constrained in counterfactual reason-
ing have been offered by the influential analyses of counterfactuals put forward 
by Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973). The leading idea of these analyses is that a 
counterfactual claim is true in the closest possible world where the antecedent is 
 
1 Another important notion of propositional imagination is that of supposition (Arcangeli 
2018; Nichols 2006), which plays an important role in Sorensen’s (1992) account of scien-
tific thought experiments. There are, however, no accounts of modelling in terms of sup-
position.  
Learning through the Scientific Imagination 
 
69 
true and the consequent is also true. By ‘closest possible world’ we mean closest 
to the actual world—or reality. Hence, closeness—reality orientation or similar-
ity—is the key constraint on imagination that emerges from these analyses. When 
engaging in counterfactual reasoning, we select an antecedent A that is contrary 
to some relevant fact in the actual world and then draw a consequence C in the 
A-worlds that are closest to the actual world. However, the antecedent A selects a 
set of possible worlds (the A-worlds), not all of which are relevant for the assess-
ment of the counterfactual conditional. The A-world that is closest to reality is the 
one that determines its truth. When one ponders what would have happened if 
Hillary Clinton had won the elections in 2016, one considers how things would 
have been in a world that is just like the real world apart from the election of 
Hillary Clinton in 2016.  
There is one general challenge for these analyses, and three specific issues 
concerning their application to modelling. The general challenge concerns the de-
tails of the notion of closeness, which remains insufficiently characterised. Stal-
naker appeals to the “intuitive idea that the nearest, or least different, world in 
which antecedent is true is the one that should be selected” (1981: 88), but does 
not provide any explanation of what ‘least different’ means. And Lewis (1973) 
assumes a primitive notion of similarity of worlds, which “leaves the notion of 
similarity unconstrained and mysterious” (Arlo-Costa 2019: Sect. 6.1).  
The three more specific challenges for an application of these analyses to 
models are posed by completeness, epistemic access, and intersubjective access.  
Salis and Frigg (2020: 43) notice that possible worlds are complete, yet sci-
entific models cannot be said to be complete in the same way. What completeness 
means is open to interpretation. However, they notice that there is an intuitive 
link between completeness and the principle of Excluded Middle (EM). Accord-
ing to EM, for any proposition p it is the case that either p or not-p holds. Models 
are not complete in this sense because there are many propositions that are neither 
true nor false in models. For example, the proposition that Mont Blanc is the 
tallest mountain in Europe is neither true nor false in the ideal gas model. How-
ever, if possible worlds are complete, the closest possible world in which M is true 
is one in which this claim is true even though it describes matters of fact that have 
nothing to do with the model. On this analysis, the counterfactual “if a gas were 
composed of point particles exerting no intermolecular forces, then Mont Blanc 
would be the tallest mountain in Europe” would come out true. The truth value 
of this counterfactual, however, should be indeterminate. The world of the model 
does not satisfy EM and is not complete in the same way in which possible worlds 
are supposed to be complete. 
Stalnaker’s semantic analysis of counterfactuals does not allow for this kind 
of indeterminacy because it accepts the principle of Conditional Excluded Middle 
(CEM). According to this principle, either M □→ C is true or M □→ ¬C is true. 
Stalnaker’s semantics uses a selection function that picks a unique closest possible 
world where C is either true or false and, hence, either M □→ C or M □→ ¬C 
holds. In contrast, Lewis’s semantics deploys a relation of comparative similarity 
that defines a weak total ordering of all possible worlds with respect to each pos-
sible world (what he calls ‘a system of spheres’). On this proposal, when M □→ C 
is true, C is true in all the closest M-worlds. However, when C is true only in some 
of the M-worlds but not in others, CEM fails because neither M □→ C nor M □→ 




provement with respect to Stalnaker’s original proposal. Lewis’s analysis, how-
ever, poses a different problem. The specific indeterminacy of models seems to be 
difficult to capture in a way that applies universally to all models. Salis and Frigg 
suggest that the particular way in which the world of a model is incomplete seems 
to require “a tailor-made cross-world similarity metric” such that “the counter-
factual conditional M □→ C has no determinate truth value for all the right Cs” 
(2020: 44).  
Williamson (2020) finds the objection unconvincing. He notices that in any 
conversational context many things that are true are also irrelevant and that a 
notion of relevance as a standard Gricean conversational implicature could be 
used to explain the sort of indeterminacy that is characteristic of counterfactual 
conditionals with irrelevant consequents in models. On this proposal, the world 
of the model is as complete as any other possible world and the consequents that 
seem to be indeterminate are determinate yet scientifically irrelevant. Further-
more, a semantic analysis of ‘in’ could include a stipulated relevance condition 
such that C is true in the model if and only if two conditions obtain: i) if M then 
C holds; and ii) C is relevant to M. Williamson states that the latter, however, “is 
hardly worth the trouble, since the irrelevant truth is scientifically harmless” 
(2020).  
While this may be the case, the fact remains that the conditional claim “if a 
gas were composed of point particles exerting no intermolecular forces, then 
Mont Blanc would be the tallest mountain in Europe” is intuitively neither true 
nor false. One may have independent reasons to preserve CEM and the complete-
ness of possible worlds, and hence reject the intuition. Or one may recognise that 
scientific models pose a serious challenge to the completeness of possible worlds 
in the context of scientific modelling and go for a different analysis that does not 
satisfy CEM. This would be coherent with the face value practice of modelling 
and the theoretical principle of naturalism, and it would provide an opportunity 
for the development of a potentially more fruitful analysis of the sort of indeter-
minacy involved in models. 
The second issue raised by an interpretation of modelling in terms of coun-
terfactual imagination concerns epistemic access. Salis and Frigg (2020: 44) no-
tice that there is no general agreement on the epistemology of counterfactual con-
ditionals. Kment originally held that our ability to gain counterfactual knowledge 
“needs to be based on rules that permit us to determine which propositions are 
cotenable with a given antecedent” (2006: 288). Any epistemology of counterfac-
tual conditionals needs to identify these rules. Currently, however, there is no 
general agreement on what these rules are. In particular, these rules should rely 
on a previous understanding of the similarity relation between possible worlds, 
which (as mentioned above) is still insufficiently characterised. These problems 
are inherited by a counterfactual epistemology of models. The set of Cs that are 
true in a model is different in each case. An epistemology of counterfactual con-
ditionals in models needs to build on a previous understanding of the tailor-made 
cross-world similarity metric for each case or, as Salis and Frigg tentatively sug-
gest, “perhaps we can identify a series of overarching types of metrics for different 
types of models” (2020: 44).  
The final issue raised by the interpretation of modelling in terms of counter-
factual imagination is intersubjective access. Many imaginative activities are sol-
itary and idiosyncratic. This is typically the case in the sort of imaginative activi-
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ties involved in dreams and daydreams, and in many cases of counterfactual im-
agination. Modellers, however, work as members of a scientific community. 
Their imaginative activities have a social dimension that cannot be explained 
merely in terms of the ways in which individual modellers think in their own sub-
jective and idiosyncratic ways. Godfrey-Smith himself recognises that model-
based science “has sociological and formal features, as well as psychological 
ones” (2006: 728) and emphasises that he is not interested in providing an account 
of the psychological mechanisms underlying model-based reasoning. Thus, the 
analysis of the sort of imagination involved in modelling should build on the so-
cial practice of model-based science, and hence on the ways in which scientists 
think and talk about models as members of specific scientific communities. And 
while the counterfactual imagination may be compatible with this analysis (once 
the above problems are solved), a framework that builds merely on this kind of 
imagination does not have the theoretical resources to explain the social dimen-
sion of modelling. This social dimension, as I will argue, is the key feature of a 
different notion, compatible and yet distinct from the counterfactual imagination. 
This is the notion of make-believe that I will explore in the next section.  
 
4. Make-believe 
Salis and Frigg (2020) argue that make-believe is crucial to theoretical modelling. 
Walton (1990) originally introduced the notion of make-believe as a social imag-
inative activity with normative and objective content that is determined by the 
use of props. Props are ordinary objects that make propositions fictionally true in 
virtue of a prescription to imagine something. They are material objects that can 
be perceived and shared by different individuals in a context and thereby provide 
the physical scaffolding that enables the social, intersubjective dimension of 
make-believe. Effectively, props afford and constrain the imaginative processes of 
participants in the make-believe by making manifest the relevant prescriptions to 
imagine.  
What is fictional truth? Naturally, many have spelled out the notion of fic-
tional truth—or fictionality—in terms of fictional worlds. The idea comes from 
the literature on fiction, where storytelling is often construed as an activity that 
indicates or creates a fictional world. On this view, Mary Shelley’s act of story-
telling selects (among the logical space of possibilities) or generates (through her 
creative imagination) a world where it is true that Dr Frankenstein creates a hid-
eous, intelligent and articulate creature through an unconventional laboratory ex-
periment. This somewhat natural way of thinking about fictional truth as truth in 
the world of the story is interpreted in two main ways, literal and non-literal—or 
imaginative. On the literal interpretation, fictional truth is construed as a variety 
of truth and being fictionally true is being true in a possible (Lewis 1978) or, per-
haps, impossible (Berto 2011; Priest 1997) world. This notion of fictional truth as 
truth in a world fits well with an analysis of modelling in terms of counterfactual 
imagination, but it also raises similar problems.  
On a second, non-literal interpretation, fictional truth is not a variety of truth 
but a property of the propositions that are among the prescriptions to imagine in 
force in a fictional story (Eagle 2007; Currie 1990). This alternative notion of fic-
tional truth, which is Walton’s (1990) preferred notion, is often paraphrased in 




ticular game of make-believe and has normative and objective features. It is nor-
mative because it depends on the rules that guide the imaginings of participants 
in the game. It is objective because it is independent of the individual imaginings 
of participants who may or may not conform with the prescriptions to imagine in 
force in a certain game of make-believe. Furthermore, on Walton’s account, fic-
tional truths divide between primary fictional truths and implied fictional truths 
of the game. Primary fictional truths are the initial assumptions of an episode of 
make-believe and they are generated directly from the props. Implied fictional 
truths are inferences generated indirectly from the primary fictional truths via 
principles of generation (more on these in the next Section). 
As stated above, props are ordinary objects that can be perceived and shared 
by different individuals in a context. What sort of props are involved in a literary 
work? It is common to indicate, vaguely, the literary work of fiction as the prop. 
But we can be more specific and say that the concrete tokens constituting the text 
of a literary fiction are the props that prescribe to imagine in certain ways. These 
are concrete marks on paper, a computer screen or a tablet, which can be per-
ceived and shared by different individuals in a context. In some cases, they can 
also be the concrete sounds produced by someone reading a text aloud, hence 
enabling an audible rather than visual experience of the text. These visible marks 
(or audible sounds) are the props that enable and constrain the intersubjective and 
social dimension of make-believe in literary fictions.  
These ideas contribute an explanation of model building and model devel-
opment. Let us start from model building. A scientist builds a model by specifying 
a model description—the prop—that prescribes certain imaginings. Like the text 
of a fictional story, the model description, which involves a linguistic and mathe-
matical description, is constituted by concrete, physical marks that can be per-
ceived and shared in a context. These perceptible marks provide the physical scaf-
folding that make the social dimension of modelling possible. They can be shared 
by different scientists in a context, hence enabling intersubjective communication 
within the scientific community and providing tools for the investigation of par-
ticular issues.  
Similarly to the text of a story, the model description constrains the model’s 
assumptions, or primary fictional truths, coherently with the model’s prescrip-
tions to imagine. These prescriptions to imagine involve the attribution of physi-
cal properties that only concrete objects can have, yet there are no such objects. 
For example, the model description of the ideal gas prescribes imagining that the 
molecules composing the gas are point particles having no volume of their own 
and bouncing against each other in elastic collisions. In this way, scientists build 
an imaginary system wherein imaginary gas molecules interact under imaginary 
conditions. This imaginary system emerges from the propositions that are among 
the prescriptions to imagine of the model. Hence, it is natural to interpret model 
building as a cognitive process that is enabled by a use of imagination that diverts 
from reality in some respects and to certain degrees for the purpose of building a 
surrogate, imaginary system.  
What sort of object is this imaginary system? Realists about model systems 
argue that they are abstract created entities (Contessa 2007; Giere 1988). Antire-
alists hold that there are no model systems (Frigg 2010; Salis 2020a). Imaginings 
have no ontological commitments. So, for example, imagining a witch or telling 
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a fictional story about some witch do not commit to the existence of any witch.2 
Similarly, imagining an ideal gas or specifying a linguistic and mathematical de-
scription of an ideal gas in the imagination do not commit to the existence of any 
ideal gas. Walton’s theory is compatible with both realism and antirealism about 
fictional entities. Personally, I have a strong preference for antirealism and I there-
fore assume that there are no model systems. What follows from this is that model 
systems are built in the imagination, without any commitment to their existence. 
Hence, there are no model systems. 
Yet, there are models. This much seems undisputable. So, what are they? 
The term ‘model’ is often ambiguous between different uses. Sometime it is used 
to refer to the model system. A realist about model systems can endorse this in-
terpretation of the term ‘model’ and argue that models are abstract objects. Real-
ism about model systems, however, should be motivated by theoretical consider-
ations that do not depend upon this particular problem. As stated above, I assume 
antirealism and hold that there are no model systems. This together with the as-
sumption that models are model systems entail the absurd consequence that there 
are no models. Some other time the term is used to refer to the model description. 
But a mathematical equation or a string of linguistic symbols are not a model of 
anything unless they are interpreted in certain ways and according to certain con-
ventions. So, a model description on its own is not a model. However, a model 
description together with its interpretation (its propositional content) can be iden-
tified with the model. On this view, which is the one I favour, a model is akin to 
a fictional story that the scientist tells by employing certain symbols (linguistic or 
mathematical) interpreted according to certain conventions.  
The propositional content of a model can be analysed according to different 
accounts depending on one’s theoretical stance. Descriptivist accounts will ana-
lyse it in terms of general propositions with a uniqueness condition where the 
description involves apparent reference to a particular (singular) entity, à la Rus-
sell (1905). Referentialist accounts will analyse it in terms of general propositions 
and, where certain singular terms such as proper names are involved, singular 
propositions (realism) or gappy propositions (antirealism), à la Braun (2005), or 
no proposition (antirealism), à la Walton (1990: Ch.10). While philosophers of 
science have well known descriptivist preferences, choosing over one or the other 
of these options requires independent theoretical reasons that do not hinge on 
anything specific to the case of models. For this reason, I will not take a stance 
on this particular issue. 
So, on this proposal, a scientist builds a model (intended in this way) by spec-
ifying a model description (the prop) together with its interpretation (the primary 
fictional truths of the model determined by the model’s prescriptions to imagine). 
These, in turn, specify a model system as the object of study, but only within the 
make-believe. The model is then developed by eliciting what is implicitly true in 
 
2 Of course, there were (and in some regions of the world there still are) societies that be-
lieved in the existence of witches. These beliefs, however, are rightly rejected in most ad-
vanced societies, which find other ways to express their own sexist and misogynistic 
stances. Fictions can be about real entities. Imaginings, however, do not commit to the 
existence of the objects they seem to be about. If they are about real entities, they are so in 




it—or fictionally true. This requires going beyond the initial assumptions via prin-
ciples of generation. Specifying what these principles are is no easy feat. I will 
discuss this problem in the next Section.  
 
5. Constraints on Imagination 
Make-believe is a type of imagination that is constrained by the game’s prescrip-
tions to imagine and by the principles of generation. In his critical assessment of 
Salis and Frigg (2020), Williamson (2020) notices that there is no general agree-
ment on the epistemology of make-believe. Understanding our ability to learn 
through make-believe requires an investigation into the sort of constraints operat-
ing on it, including the principles of generation of implicit truths in the model. 
Salis (2020b) indicates at least three distinct types of such constraints, architec-
tural, context-specific, and epistemic.  
Architectural constraints are determined by the cognitive structure of the im-
agination and operate on all uses of imagination across different contexts. From 
the contemporary literature in cognitive science emerge two main architectural 
constraints, mirroring and quarantining.3 Imagination displays mirroring when 
imaginings carry inferential commitments that are similar to those carried by iso-
morphic beliefs—that is, beliefs that have the same propositional content. If I be-
lieve that it is raining outside, I also believe that the pavement is wet. Similarly, 
if I imagine that it is raining outside, I also imagine that the pavement is wet. The 
inferences we make, however, typically depend on background assumptions and 
on the specific aims and practical interests that direct our reasoning. Thus, mir-
roring interacts with context-specific constraints to determine the sort of infer-
ences that are allowed in particular episodes of imagination.  
Quarantining is displayed when imaginings do not entail beliefs and do not 
guide action in the real world. In other words, quarantining guarantees that im-
aginings have effect only within an imagined episode. For example, if I believe 
that it is raining outside, and I have a desire not to get wet, I will pick up my 
umbrella on my way out of the house. But if I merely imagine that it is raining 
outside, I will not act in the same way. This does not mean that nothing of real-
world importance can be learned through imagination. Learning about reality 
through imagination, however, requires exiting the imagination and exporting 
what one has learned outside of it and into reality. One can study the ideal gas 
model without automatically learning anything of real-world importance. Gain-
ing knowledge of empirical truths about real world gases requires exporting what 
one has learned in the imagination onto reality.  
While architectural constraints operate on all uses of imagination through 
different contexts, context-specific constraints are determined by disciplinary con-
ventions and interpretative practices. Individuals who engage in these practices 
imagine in ways that are specific to the practices themselves. Context-specific con-
straints correspond to Walton’s principles of generation. They are the constraints 
that enable the generation of implicit truths in a game of make-believe. Inspired 
 
3 Salis and Frigg (2020) identify mirroring and quarantining as two key features of propo-
sitional imagination (together with a third one, which is the typical freedom of imagina-
tion). See also Leslie (1987), Nichols (2004), and Nichols and Stich (2003) for the original 
discussion of mirroring and quarantining based on experimental and theoretical research 
in cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind. 
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by Lewis (1978), Walton (1990) identifies two main principles of generation, the 
reality principle and the mutual belief principle.4  
The reality principle keeps the world of the game as close as possible to the 
real world. Effectively, this principle relies on the notion of closeness that is key 
to Lewis’s and Stalnaker’s standard analyses of counterfactual conditionals. This 
brings some, although not all, of the aforementioned problems into the framework 
of make-believe. First, the notion of closeness—reality orientation or similarity—
is left unconstrained and mysterious because it is insufficiently characterised. Sec-
ond, within the framework of make-believe, the reality principle could be imple-
mented without commitment to the completeness of possible worlds. This is be-
cause Walton’s (1990) appeal to reality orientation is quite loose and does not 
commit to the completeness of fictional worlds. But as Salis and Frigg (2020) em-
phasise, different models are incomplete in their own specific ways, which raises 
the issue of how to provide the right cross-world similarity metric for each partic-
ular case. Third, there is no general agreement on the rules that enable us to de-
termine which co-inferences are allowed by a given antecedent. These rules 
should rely on a previous understanding of the notion of similarity of worlds, 
which is currently unavailable.  
The second principle identified by Walton is the mutual-belief principle, 
which imports the mutual beliefs of the members of the community in which the 
game originated. Beliefs are of many different kinds. In the context of modelling, 
theoretical beliefs and experts’ opinions are fundamental for drawing certain in-
ferences within particular models. More context-specific constraints are also pos-
sible and new research through historical and contemporary case studies may 
contribute a better understanding of what they are. Among them are mathemati-
cal constraints provided by the particular mathematical tools deployed in a 
model, interpretations of data, and more.  
Finally, epistemic constraints are determined by the particular sort of 
knowledge we want to acquire. In the context of modelling, there are two main 
types of knowledge gained through imagination, knowledge of the imaginary sce-
narios described by model descriptions, and knowledge of empirical truths about 
reality. These different types of knowledge correspond to two different types of 
claims generated through imagination in modelling, knowledge claims about the 
imaginary system specified by the model and knowledge claims about reality.  
Knowledge claims about imaginary systems are the claims scientists make 
within a game of make-believe, such as “the ideal gas is composed of point parti-
cles” (in the ideal gas model). These claims are produced within the make-believe, 
not without it. They are internal claims about the ideal gas (the imaginary sys-
tem), not external claims about the model (the complex entity constituted by 
model description and model content). Scientists merely imagine the content of 
these claims (rather than believing it), which are merely fictionally true (rather 
than genuinely true).  
But what sort of justification do scientists have to make these claims? In the 
traditional theory of knowledge, justification has the special role of ensuring that 
“a true belief isn’t true merely by accident” (Steup 2018). A belief that p is justified 
if and only if there are some grounds that properly increase the probability that it 
 
4 See also Evans (1982) for a classical discussion of these two principles within the frame-
work of make-believe, and Friend (2016) on the reality principle and a different take on the 




is true. When we think about the notion of justification in the context of 
knowledge of imaginary scenarios, the question we need to ask is: What sort of 
grounds probabilify knowledge claims about imaginary systems? Most plausibly, 
the relevant sort of grounds must depend on specific modelling practices. Mathe-
matical constraints operate on uses of imagination in all theoretical models. The-
oretical grounds may play an important justificatory role in many types of models, 
including macroeconomic models, models in cognitive neuroscience and models 
in physics. However, they may play a more limited role in mechanistic models in 
chronobiology and models in medicine. In these cases, empirical grounds 
(broadly construed) may play a more relevant justificatory role. More fine-grained 
distinctions about the specific constraints at work in different modelling practices 
and even in specific models could be made through case studies.  
In the ideal gas model, the principles of generation are quite straightforward 
and they are provided by the mathematical constraints imposed by the model 
equation. The model assumes that the volume 𝑉 of the imaginary gas is propor-
tional to the number of moles 𝑛. So, when one doubles 𝑛, keeping pressure and 
temperature constant, 𝑉 doubles too. In this way one learns about the properties 
of an imaginary gas. Learning about real gases, however, requires exporting what 
one has learned about the imaginary system outside of the make-believe and onto 
reality via the formulation of theoretical hypotheses. These hypotheses are of two 
kinds, model-world comparisons and direct attributions.  
Model-world comparisons are claims that scientists make about the model 
system and the real system of interest. Often, they are based on a relation of sim-
ilarity, which is usually interpreted as the sharing of certain properties in certain 
respects and to certain degrees. So, one can claim that the ideal gas and some real 
gas have similar behaviours in certain respects. For example, one can claim that 
when one doubles the number of moles 𝑛 of an ideal gas and a real gas, keeping 
pressure and temperature constant, the volume 𝑉 of the two gases will double too. 
The ideal gas, however, is only a fiction, a useful construct of the imagination. 
So, it cannot have the sort of properties that it supposedly shares with real gases. 
More generally, model systems are constructs of the imagination that do not exist 
(they are creatures of the imagination that inhabits a model’s fictional scenario) 
and therefore cannot have any of the properties that they supposedly share with 
their targets.5 As a consequence, there cannot be any real similarity between mod-
els and reality. But then how can we make sense of the common practice of sci-
entists to compare properties of the model system with properties of real systems?  
Answering this question requires that we reconceptualise the notion of simi-
larity in terms of imagined similarity, that is, in terms of the attribution of certain 
properties to model systems in the imagination, and more specifically within a 
game of make-believe. According to Walton (1990), games of make-believe can 
be of two main sorts, authorised and unofficial. A game is authorised when its 
fictional truths are determined by the model’s prescriptions to imagine and the 
relevant principles of generation. For example, the claim “the ideal gas is com-
posed of point particles” is true in the ideal gas model. A game is unofficial when 
its fictional truths are determined by some ad hoc rules. The claim that “when one 
doubles the number of moles 𝑛 of an ideal gas and a real gas, keeping pressure 
and temperature constant, the volume 𝑉 of the two gases will double too” is true 
only in an unofficial game of make-believe constrained by ad hoc rules combining 
 
5 See Hughes 1997 for a similar concern. 
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the original prescriptions to imagine of the ideal gas model and new prescriptions 
to imagine determined by the ways in which real gases behave. Real gases and 
imaginary gases cannot share any properties, so the claim is literally false. But the 
same claim is fictionally true when assessed from within the unofficial game of 
make-believe because they share such properties in the imagination. Knowledge 
claims generated from model-world comparisons can be assessed only within un-
official games of make-believe and therefore involve epistemic constraints that are 
similar to those involved in knowledge claims about imaginary systems. Their 
content is the object of imagination rather than belief. And they can only be fic-
tionally true (or false) when assessed within a game of make-believe (even if un-
official).  
Typically, however, scientists build and develop models to learn about real-
ity, to gain some better understanding of it and, possibly some new knowledge. 
This requires stepping out of the imagination through the formulation of theoret-
ical hypotheses that do not involve any reference to imaginary systems. A scientist 
can claim that “if one doubles the number of moles of a real gas, keeping pressure 
and temperature constant, the volume doubles too”. This is a hypothesis that is 
exclusively about a real system and that can be assessed and even tested for truth. 
This second sort of hypotheses is enabled by the development of the model in 
make-believe. But it is exported outside of it in the form of a direct attribution to 
real systems of the properties attributed to model systems in the make-believe. 
The knowledge claims generated from direct attributions export what one has 
learned about the model system into reality, they are exclusively about reality and 
can be assessed for truth. The attitude one has towards their content is belief and 
the sort of justification they require is typically provided by empirical evidence.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper I advocated the view that scientific modelling crucially relies on im-
agination of the make-believe variety and that this must be constrained in certain 
ways to enable knowledge of reality. I described the first overarching taxonomy 
of types of constraints on imagination in modelling, architectural, context-specific 
and epistemic. And I identified two main varieties of knowledge generated 
through modelling, knowledge of the model imaginary system and knowledge of 
reality. One aspect of the proposal that should be emphasised is that the above 
taxonomy is open and does not exhaust the many possible specific constraints on 
uses of imagination in particular modelling practices. New research through case 
studies is required to specify the different context-specific and epistemic con-
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